Hardly.

To assess failure or success in a fluid and developing situation is foolhardy. The obsessive nature of the Monday Morning Quarterbacking media is to consider the situation, declare a victor and move on to Emeril, who's in studio this morning to make some Jambalaya. Fitting a complicated situation into a short, digestible explanation is not terribly easy, and certainly not when you've got Jambalaya cooking in the studio.

Not even thirty-six hours have passed since the nuclear test took place, and in that span of time, the five parties to the multi-lateral talks that didn't detonate a nuclear device have condemned the party that did. This cannot be considered failure. It cannot be considered success, either. It is simply too soon to tell. If the goal of our North Korea policy is a nuclear free Korean peninsula, then we may have suffered a setback, but not a failure. And that setback is only if North Korea meant to detonate an extremely small device.

North Korea is not now, nor has it been, eager to dismantle their three decade old nuclear program. During the previous decade, North Korea had grown accustomed to receiving what it wanted whenever they rattled their nuclear saber. The knee-jerk reaction of the Clinton administration was to send Jimmy Carter or Madeline Albright off to North Korea, find out what they wanted, give it to them and hope that they abandoned their nuclear program or at the least stay out of the headlines long enough for them to become someone else’s problem. In light of this recent test, reassessing our policies is prudent. But to make concessions to the North Korean regime would be to reward the despot, and confirm that nothing has changed, they can still get what they want by acting out.

Josh Manchester analyzed North Korea's initial statement that they would conduct a nuclear test. Looking over the facts of the case, the impotence of North Korea is plain. They telegraphed their move. They detonated a device. Analysis indicates it was likely a fizzle. This could indicate a technical problem with their design or it could be a ruse designed to degrade our expectations of them. It could also indicate that they are attempting to create low-yield compact devices that terrorists would be interested in buying. Without insight into the plans of the regime, it is impossible to understand its intentions. Regardless, the information present suggests the North Korean regime is looking to get back into the World's spotlight, likely to gain concessions and strengthen its position going forward.

This leaves us with the question of what shall we do next. First, swift, unambiguous sanctions are in order. This is not the time to issue a resolution that's a carrot on a stick, it's time to use just the stick. Further, the economic pressure the US has been exerting on North Korea needs to continue. Finally, a resumption of the six party talks is in order. If our aim is to disarm North Korea, we have really three options.

1. We can attack and disarm them by force.
2. We can negotiate multi-laterally and insist on absolute, verifiable disarmament, spelling out the consequences for any shenanigans.
3. We can discard the goal of a nuclear free Korean peninsula and help South Korea arm itself, as well as help Japan create a deterring nuclear force, as well as a missile defense shield, based on the system we are currently developing.

Non-proliferation is preferable to an arms race. Diplomatic solutions are preferable to war. Therefore the second option is the ideal course to continue on. To declare that option a failure, while the crisis is still unfolding weakens that position and undermines our ability to continue with it. By asking repeatedly as Robert Siegel did last night on All Things Considered if this test constitutes a failure of US policy, the media offers a tacit reward for the North Korean regime. Listen to hear this exchange around the 3:40 mark:

Robert Siegel: And at this point, should we look back on the past few years and say "The policy to date failed. It did not deter the North Koreans from doing this."?

Christopher Hill: Well, certainly we wanted to deter the North Koreans. We put a pretty good deal on the table - a deal that I think was very much in their interests. And, uh, we worked very closely with our partners. And one of the reasons we worked closely with our partners is not in the certain belief that we were going to get the North Koreans to, to, uh, go away from a program that they've been engaged in for some thirty years. I mean this didn't just start last year with the North Koreans. But one of the reasons we engaged in this multi-lateral process was that in the event that North Korea was not deterred, we would have this collective experience, we would have this, uh, this uh, really sense of community that we have developed among the, uh, five parties, I should say. And then we are prepared to move together to the next stage. And I think, uh, we, we have a real common understanding and we'll see in the days ahead in the New York Security Council how well we've done.

RS: See, if I hear you right, you're saying plan A failed policy, but there was a plan B implicit in that and that is a success.

CH: Well, again, I think North Korea failed. North Korea failed to understand its future. Uh, it is not our failure that North Korea cannot see its future. Uh, it is our responsibility to, uh, to, uh, react to the situation, to deal with the situation, and frankly to deal with all the options we have with the understanding there is one option we don't have and that is to walk away from this.

A perceived failure in US policy weakens national resolve to continue such a policy. If we were to make changes in reaction to the behavior of the North Korean regime, they would gain prestige by forcing the alteration of US policy. In a battle where prestige and face saving is as important as genuine victory, denying them that triumph benefits our position. Therefore, unanimous condemnation, which has occurred, and the continued insistence on multi-lateral talks strengthen America's position.

As North Korea attempts to capitalize on the deep divisions in American political discourse, we must recognize that they are using data collected from these failed tests to improve their designs. The experiment failed. US policy has not, yet. A nuclear North Korea would be a failure. And while it seems that North Korea is determined to get a nuke, they do not have one as yet. We must continue to apply pressure to degrade their capability to continue development of a functional device.

The shameless adherence by the mainstream media to Democrat talking points and Bush Derangement Syndrome fantasies of Administration failure only serves to weaken our interests abroad. Our efforts on the Korean peninsula will yield fruit - they already have, in that North Korea conducted a failed test and called everyone's attention to that failure. We must be willing to allow things to play out and resist the instinct to decide what worked and what failed before the next segment of the morning news show.

Jambalaya, anyone?

Reprinted from Ennuipundit.